USURY-REVOLVING CHARGE ACCOUNTS AND THE LEGALITY OF A 1V2
MONTHLY CHARGE-State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179

N.W.2d 641 (1970).
The J.C. Penney Company, in the manner of countless firms engaged in the retail sale of merchandise for cash and credit, exacted a
one and one-half percent monthly charge on the declining balance of
its "revolving" charge accounts.' The state attorney general brought
an action 2 to enjoin J.C. Penney from charging in excess of the twelve
percent per annum maximum interest rate permitted under the usury
statutes.8
The trial court found that the operation of a revolving account
did involve a forbearance of a debt and that defendant did exact a
greater profit from its forbearance than the 12%/ permitted under statute. However, the court also found that the defendant was not a lender
of money as defined under the penalty provision of the usury statute4
1

The UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.108 defines revolving charge account as

such:
"Revolving charge account" means an arrangement between a seller and a
buyer pursuant to which (1) the seller may permit the buyer to purchase goods or
services on credit either from the seller or pursuant to a seller credit card,
(2) the unpaid balances of amounts financed arising from purchases and the credit
service and other appropriate charges are debited to an account, (3) a credit
service charge if made is not precomputed but is computed on the outstanding
unpaid balances of the buyer's account from time to time, and (4) the buyer has
the privilege of paying the balances in installments.
2 Wis. STAT. § 280.02 (Supp. 1970) provides in part:
An action to enjoin a public nuisance may be commenced and prosecuted in
the name of the state, either by the attorney general . . . or upon the relation
of a private individual ....
3 Wis. STAT. § 138.05 (Supp. 1970) provides in part:
(1) Except as authorized by other statutes, no person shall, directly or indirectly, contract for, take or receive in money, goods or things in action, or in
any other way, any greater sum or any greater value, for the loan or forbearance
of money, goods or things in action, than:
(a) At the rate of $12 upon $100 for one year computed upon the declining
principal balance of the loan or forbearance ....
WIS. STAT. § 138.09 (Supp. 1970) provides in part:
(9)(a) No person, except as authorized by statutes, shall directly or indirectly
charge, contract for or receive any interest or consideration greater than allowed
in s. 138.05 upon the loan, use or forbearance of money, goods or things in action,
or upon the loan, use or sale of credit. The foregoing prohibition shall apply to
any person... who by any device or pretense of charging for his services or otherwise seeks to obtain a greater compensation than is authorized by this section.
WIS. STAT. § 214.20 (1957) provides:
No person other than a licensee shall engage in the business of making small
loans and, directly or indirectly, charge, contract for or receive a greater rate
of interest or consideration upon any such loan than he is permitted by law to
charge, contract for or receive without being licensed under this chapter.
4 WM STAT. § 138.06 (Supp. 1970) provides in part:
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and therefore its credit practices, though usurious, were a concern "personal to the debtor." The court concluded that the charge agreement
did not comprise a public nuisance subject to abatement at the instance
of the state:
There is no evidence in this case that the defendant caters
to persons who are ignorant or necessitous; there is no evidence of
general dissatisfaction of customers; the rate charged is not unconscionable as compared with a small loan; there is no evidence
that the customers are not knowledgeable; the agreement makes it
clear that the "service charge" is 1 Y2% per month, so there is
no evidence that the charge is concealed by any obscure computations of price; where objection is made to the charge by the customer the charge is not collected.
...The imposition, if that is what it may be said to be, is upon the

individuals who apply for the revolving credit. There is no evidence that they need buy on credit or that there is anything that
compels them to apply for credit, except their own convenience. 5
On appeal by both parties the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that an injunction should issue against the "usurious
practices which dearly constitute a public nuisance." 7
To decide the case, the court applied a test for usury recognized in
an earlier Wisconsin case: 8
The definition of usury imports the existence of certain essential elements generally enumerated as (1) a loan or forbearance... ;
(2) an understanding between the parties that the principal shall
be repayable absolutely; (3) the exaction of a greater profit than is
allowed by law; and (4) an intention to violate the law.9
The essential issue in regard to the above four criteria was whether the
1 % monthly charge was in fact consideration for forbearance of collection of the debt, or was merely a "time-price" differential that would
not be subject to the statutes.1 0
Forbearance generally signifies the giving of time for the payment
(2) Any lender or agent of a lender who violates any provisions of s. 138.05
may be fined not less than $25 nor more than $500, or imprisoned not more than
6 months, or both.
5 State v. J.C. Penney Co., No. 125-287 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct., April 22, 1969) (the
decision is unreported).
6 The state appealed the trial court's order denying injunctive relief and dismissing
the complaint, and J.C. Penney Co. appealed, challenging -the finding that its credit
practices violated Wis. STAT. § 138.05(1). 48 Wis. 2d at 130, 179 N.W.2d at 643.
7 State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 155, 179 N.W.2d 641, 657 (1970).
8 Zang v. Schumann, 262 Wis. 570, 579, 55 N.W.2d 864, 868 (1952).
9 48 Wis. 2d at 132-33, 179 N.W.2d at 645. As was pointed out by the court, the definition was summarized in 55 AM. JuR. Usury § 12 (1946).
10 See statutes cited note S supra.

NOTES
debt."1

of a
However, it does not necessarily require an actual loan of
12
money. Penney argued that in order to have forbearance, the agreement must extend the maturity date of a loan already in existence at
the time the agreement was entered into. 13 This contention was based
upon the premise that forbearance applies only to debts "then due and
payable." 14 Under the agreement terms,15 the customer was not bound
to pay the full cash price at any certain date. Consequently, since the
cash price as such would never become due, the difference between the
original cash price and any subsequently paid amount could not be
considered a charge for forbearance.' 6
This proposition was quickly disposed of with the observation that
"the actual forbearance occurs after the purchase when the purchaser
does not pay within thirty days."' 17 The court would not be dissuaded
by the absence in the agreement of any specific due date, and concluded
that agreement subsection 2, which reads in part, "I will, within one
11 London v. Toney, 263 N.Y. 439, 189 N.E. 485 (1934) (case involved an agreement
to guarantee payment of a mortgage indebtedness in consideration for an extension of
time of payment; court held the extension and guarantee agreements usurious where
more than the legal rate was charged).
12 Van Schaick v. Edwards, 2 Johns. Cas. 355, 364 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1801):
If a loan be necessary to constitute a usurious contract, yet it is not necessary
to the creation of a loan that the money should be paid on the one hand, and
received on the other; for the circumstance of a man's money remaining in
another's hands, in consequence of an agreement for that purpose, will constitute
a loan.
Accord, Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins. & Trust Co., 3 N.Y. 344 (1850).
'3 48 Wis. 2d at 134, 179 N.W.2d at 646.
14 Id. (the phrase is from BLACKS LAw DiCTrONARY 773 (4th ed. 1951), under the
definition of forbearance). See Heilos v. State Land Co., 113 N.J. Eq. 239, 166 A. 330 (Ch.
1933) (bonus paid on mortgage for extension of due date was in excess of amount allowed
by law for the loan or forbearance of money).
15 Penney's Charge Account Agreement:
I agree that 1. I will pay the time sale price of each item charged to my account,
consisting of (a) the cash sale price, plus (1) a time price differential (service
charge) computed by applying the unpaid balance of the cash sale price and any
unpaid service charge on each of my monthly billing dates . . . [at] the rate
of 1-'/%, but service charges shall not exceed the lawful maximum. 2. I will,
within one month after each monthly billing date, make an installment payment
in accordance with your then current payment schedule . . . . Payments will be
applied to the time sale prices of purchases in the order of purchase. I understand that I may prepay my unpaid balance at any time. 3. Upon any default by
me, my entire balance shall at your option become payable. I will to the extent
permitted by law, pay your attorney's fees if this agreement is referred for collection to an attorney, plus court costs. 4. You may limit or terminate my account.
I will upon request return my account identification, which shall remain your
property.
16 48 Wis. 2d at 134-35, 179 N.W.2d at 646; Brief for Defendant at 6, 7.
17 Id. at 135, 179 N.W.2d at 646.
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month after each monthly billing date, make an installment payment,""' was quite sufficient to impose an obligation on the buyer.
A "time-price" sale requires the giving to the prospective purchaser
the option of two distinct prices-a cash price and a "time" price. Both
prices, once arrived at between the parties, are unchanging. The concept is well illustrated in an early United States Supreme Court case:
But it is manifest that if A proposes to sell to B a tract of land
for $10,000 in cash, or for $20,000 payable in ten annual instalments, and if B prefers to pay the larger sum to gain time, the contract cannot be called usurious. A vendor may prefer $100 in hand
to double the sum in expectancy, and a purchaser may prefer the
greater price with the longer credit ....

Such a contract has none

of the characteristics of usury; it is not for the loan of money, or
forbearance of a debt.19
Time-price sales have been traditionally excluded from the usury statutes in most jurisdictions, 20 and most commonly utilized in the area of
motor vehicle installment sales and other high price items.2 1 There is
little question but that, when considering form, a revolving credit
22
agreement differs substantially from a true time-price sale.
In the gigantic field of modern commercial credit, general usury
laws, the Wisconsin case notwithstanding, are suffering from increasing
18 Id. at 136, 179 N.W.2d at 647.
19 Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 US. 115, 118-19 (1861), quoted at 48 Wis. 2d at 140, 179 N.W.2d
at 649.
20 See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1077-84 (1967).
21 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-41 (1970).
22 The Penney court differentiated the revolving type of account from the true
time-price sale:
1. There is no loan as such.
2. The contract . . . permits the purchaser to pay cash and to lower the
cost of the merchandise by payment even after the services charges have been
begun.
3. There is a cash sales price quoted . . . so that the purchaser may, by
his own will, determine the length of time he will take to pay and the extra
charges that he will be compelled to pay.
4. There may be multiple sales with debits to the account . . . and also
credits for payments.
5. The "service charge" is not a fixed amount, independent of the amount
owed ....

6. [T]he absence of a quotation . . . of a time sale price as well as a cash
price... is an indicia that it is not a bona fide time sale price . ...
7. There is no evidence that the cost of the service ... bears any relation to
the "service charge."
8. The contract ... is made prior to any sale and is not part of the sale ....
9. The contract does not differ in form from one customer to the next nor
does it differ in substance.
10. The "service charge" is not a penalty for failure to pay on time installments as they come due ....
Rather it is a charge for the privilege of not paying
the cash price promptly ....
11. The sales tax is computed on the cash price.
48 Wis. 2d at 144-49, 179 N.W.2d at 651-54.

1971]

NOTES

disuse. Principal categories in the credit industry have their own regulatory statutes; broadly included among these would be small loans,
banks and trust companies, industrial and private banks, savings and
loan associations, credit unions, investment companies, pawnbrokers,
and installment sales. 23 The end result has been to drain the general

usury statute of both potency and relevance in regard to legitimate
credit transactions:
By anachronistic legal reasoning, if a man borrowed money
from a bank to buy a car, he was protected by the usury law; if he
bought from a dealer "on time," the sky was the limit. The
result was a plethora of statutes to cover sales of cars and other
goods. But since these statutes permit much higher rates, it has
been a case of dealing with usury by legalizing it. Thus usury today
is largely a matter of license, for to charge more than 6 per cent
may make one man a "loan shark," while another may legally exact
24
30 per cent.

The disparity between the general usury rate and that of other
transactions involving credit is clearly apparent in New Jersey law,
which permits up to 8% under the usury law,25 10% under the conven-

tional installment contract, 26 and a lofty 24% on loans of money under
$500.27 Though the differences in regulation are considerable, all
three categories include, if not a direct extension of money, certainly a
forbearance to collect it.
The New Jersey courts have not yet confronted the revolving
charge account, but they have considered usury in relation to install23 For an excellent discussion on usury generally, see Benfield, Money, Mortgages and
Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19 CAsE W. Rs. L. Rxv. 819 (1968).
24 Bernstein, Background of a Gray Area in Law: The Checkered Career of Usury,
51 A.B.AJ. 846, 850 (1965).
25 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31:1-1 (Supp. 1970) provides in part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, no person shall, upon contract,
take, directly or indirectly, for loan of any money, wares, merchandise, goods and
chattels, above the value of $6.00 for the forbearance of $100.00 for a year, and
after that rate for a greater or less sum or for longer or shorter time; and except further, that the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance . . . may . . .
provide that the value .
shall be a value more than $6.00 but not more than
$8.00 ....

26 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-41 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-1 (1970) defines
"Retail installment contract" as such:
[A]ny contract... between a retail seller and a retail buyer evidencing an agreement to pay the retail purchase price of goods, or any part thereof, in 2 or more
installments over a period of time, and pursuant to which title to or a lien upon
the goods is retained or taken by the retail seller for the payment of the retail
buyer's obligation. [T]he bailee or lessee agrees to pay as compensation a
sum substantially equivalent to or in excess of the value of the goods ....
See also note 22 supra.
27 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:10-14 (Supp. 1970).
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ment sales. In Steflenauer v. Mytelka & Rose, Inc.,28 the court refused
to apply the statute in a case that, strictly interpreted, was in violation
of the usury law. Plaintiff, interested in opening a coin operated dry
cleaning business, entered into a conditional sales contract with defendant to purchase equipment valued at $18,500. After a down payment
there remained $9,750 to be repaid at the rate of 7% per year for
four years, divided into 48 monthly installments of $260, a total of
$12,480 due. 29 Plaintiff contended that the service charge was nothing
more than a "cloak to cover a usurious transaction."80 The court disagreed, and instead adopted a "general rule" 3' that excludes bona fide
conditional sales from the ambit of usury statutes even though the finance charge exceeds the legal rate. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
was more explicit:
For the reasons given by the trial court, we agree the transaction was
a sale, and hence beyond the general usury statute, N.J.S.A. 31: 1-1.32
The Wisconsin court in Penney, after properly concluding that the
charge agreement involved a "forbearance of money and not a time
28 87 N.J. Super. 506, 210 A.2d 88 (Ch. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 46 N.J. 299, 216 A.2d
585 (1966).
29 This kind of credit transaction would normally come within N.J. STAtr. ANN.
§ 17:16C-41 (Retail installment sales) and its allowable 10% interest rate. But there is a
limitation imposed by § 17:16C-I(a) as follows:
"Goods" means all chattels personal having a cash price of $7,500.00 or less,
but not including money or choses in action or goods sold for commercial or
business use.
As a result, this transaction is not covered under the sales act and is thereby exposed to
regulation under the usury law, which, until 1968, allowed a maximum of 6%.
80 87 N.J. Super. at 510, 210 A.2d at 90; see W.T. Grant Co. v. Walsh, 100 N.J. Super.
60, 241 A.2d 46 (Cty. Dist. Ct. 1968), where plaintiff store sued to recover payment due on a
supposed "Retail installment sales contract," which in fact involved selling a customer a
book of coupons totalling $200.00 valid for purchases in any of the chain's stores. The
coupon plan obligated the customer to pay $246.01 (commencing immediately) over a 24month period, thus imposing both interest charges for purchases not yet made and
liability for full payment in the event of loss, theft, or destruction. The court held that
the inducement to sign a retail installment contract whereby the customer received no
goods, but only scrip to be used as money, was governed by the general usury statute
and the agreement therefore was void.
31 Id. The rule is stated in an annotation in 143 A.L.R. 238, 242 (1943) as follows:
It is well settled that where the contract of conditional sale is bona fide and the
finance charge or other similar charge is included therein as a part of the total
"time" or credit price of the chattel which the purchaser thereby agrees to pay
upon a deferred payment basis, the finance charge does not constitute usury,
even though such charge, if considered as interest, would be in excess of the
highest lawful interest upon the cash purchase price for the time payment
thereof is deferred under the contract, provided of course that the transaction
was what it purported to be and not in fact a loan.
82 46 N.J. at 300, 216 A.2d at 585.
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sale," 83 felt constrained to enlist the aid of the usury statute to protect
the public; but, as their own lower court cogently argued, no aid was
required.3 4 The court's preoccupation with the time-sale was unfounded, for it is nothing more than classifying both parts of a credit
sale, i.e., the cash price and the credit charge, together as a sale, and
considering the entire sum charged as the price. The purpose and the
result were to circumvent the usury laws. With distinctions clearly in
mind, the fact remains that time-sales and revolving account sales both
provide for the purchase of goods, and both involve the extension of
credit and a forbearance to collect the cash price. This vital point was
recognized by the Steffenauer court:
Every credit transaction partakes of a loan, a loan by the seller
to the buyer. Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish "loan" from
credit per se. Where violation of a usury statute is alleged, semantics
must give way to substance; and the question must always be
whether the transaction in question was the kind of transaction
which it was the intention of the legislature to prevent .... Frequently, the issue is formulated in terms of "credit" versus "cash"
35
sale.

. . . In either case the real issue is the same.

Although the Steffenauer case was decided on the basis of a timesale, and in a commercial rather than consumer setting, there is no indication of a different outcome had it been a revolving account. In circumstances where the buyer deals directly with the seller, and where
the buyer has been advised of the charge rates, there can be no question
of the existence of a bona fide credit sale. The revolving account, as
struck down in Penney, fully satisfies the two criteria set forth in Steffenauer to validate an installment sale:

First, that the facts reveal an intent between the parties to the
transaction to consummate an actual purchase and sale. Second,
that the purchaser be fully aware of what he is doing, and that he
have an opportunity to make an intelligent choice of buying a
chattel for less now rather than more later.38

New Jersey takes a conservative view of usury, and invokes the
statute-as befits its purpose-only in cases of unconscionable con33 48 Wis. 2d at 144, 179 N.W.2d at 651.
84 See p. 574 supra.
85 87 N.J. Super. at 517, 210 A.2d at 94-95 (emphasis added) (the court quoted from
Langille v. Central-Penn Nat'l Bank, 38 Del. Ch. 382, 386, 153 A.2d 211, 213 (1959)).
Tennessee defines the 11% per month charge on revolving accounts as a "Time Price
Differential"; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-11-104(c) (1964). See Dennis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Tenn. -, 446 S.W.2d 260 (1969) (court makes no distinction between time price sale and
revolving charge account).
36 87 N.J. Super. at 512, 210 A.2d at 92.
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duct.87 Today's consumer in the legitimate credit market is protected
from such conduct. Through the application of comprehensive disclosure provisions within the Truth in Lending Act3 8 the credit buyer
enjoys substantial freedom from possible subterfuge and fraud. And
when considering usury, these are the proper areas for inquiry-not
the form of the sale. As was duly noted by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, the 7% charged in Steffenauer actually averaged out to 14%
per year on the unpaid balance. 39
It is therefore doubtful that New Jersey will follow the course
charted by Wisconsin. The Ste fenauer court concluded their decision
with the observation that "[t]o hold otherwise . . .would be to ignore

the facts of everyday commercial life." 40 Indeed, other states are giving
these rates their unequivocal approval. For example, Pennsylvania allows 1

% per month; 41 California and Delaware both permit 11/2%

"[oin so much of the outstanding balance as does not exceed one thou42
sand dollars" and 1% on the excess.
The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code, although presently embroiled in controversy, 43 will nevertheless exert considerable
influence toward acceptance of the Penney rates. As stated in the introductory section, it is the purpose of the UCCC,
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing retail
installment sales, consumer credit, small loans and usury;
(b) to provide rate ceilings to assure an adequate supply of
44
credit to consumers ....
These rate ceilings would allow, for revolving charge accounts, a
37 See Paley v. Barton Say. and Loan Ass'n, 82 N.J. Super. 75, 196 A.2d 682 (App.
Div. 1964) ($10,000 charge made by defendant in consideration of holding $1,000,000
available for one year for purpose of purchasing mortgages held not unconscionable even
though no mortgages were obtained for purchase; "Since no loan of money . . .existed
here, usury could not be involved." Id. at 81, 196 A.2d at 685); Altman v. Altman, 8 N.J.
Super. 301, 72 A.2d 541 (Ch.1950) (contract requiring defendants to pay plaintiffs net
profits from resale of hotel property held to be a compromise of a disputed claim and
thus valid consideration; defense of usury fails unless clearly established). See also W.T.
Grant Co. v. Walsh, 100 N.J. Super. 60, 241 A.2d 46 (Cty. Dist. Ct. 1968).
38 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1969).
39 46 N.J. at 300, 216 A.2d at 585.
40 87 N.J. Super. at 517, 210 A.2d at 94.
41 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1904 (Supp. 1970).
42 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1810.2 (West Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4337 (1969).

43 See Felsenfeld, Competing State and Federal Roles in Consumer Credit Law, 45
N.Y.U.L. REV. 487 (1970); Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 53 (1969).
44 UCCC § 1.102(a),(b).
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monthly charge up to "2 per cent of that part.. which is $500 or less
45
and I /2 per cent on that part ... which is more than $500."
"The facts of every day commercial life," as embodied in the
UCCC, will influence the courts to a greater degree than widely varying and inconsistent usury statutes. 46 "I/2 per cent on the declining
balance" is firmly established as a fixture of American commercial life.
Crandon H. Randell
45 UCCC § 2.207(3).
46 The ceiling on interest rates in general usury statutes range from 6%
(Rhode Island); Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire have no limit.

to 21%

